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By Ryosei Kokubun, Chairman of the Asian Affairs Research Council
China is becoming increasingly unfathomable. Surveillance cameras are in operation everywhere, and online vigilance is simply getting suffocating. In political study sessions organized by the Chinese Communist Party, the words of party General Secretary Xi Jinping, the president of China, are recited and transcribed like a holy text. Xi Jinping teachings are also taught in schools. Who would have predicted such a reality in China, which emerged from the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s?
Among China scholars, it is whispered that what matters now is not a “Taiwan contingency” but a “China contingency,” which essentially means “Xi Jinping risk.” The current authoritarian politics only seem to prove the internal fragility, not the strength, of his regime. Where is China headed, and what are these authoritarian politics for?
Prior to the Xi Jinping era, the country’s official ideology was the “socialist market economy,” which formed the basis of the theory promoted by Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader from the later 1970s through the 1980s. The present regime does not deny the idea, but rarely refers to it these days.
Deng’s goals
Deng came up with the concept of a socialist market economy after he witnessed the Soviet Union’s collapse and determined that China needed to introduce a market economy and develop international competitiveness so as not to repeat Moscow’s failure,
While adhering to the basic principles of public ownership and the leadership of the Communist Party, the country would utilize the principles of the market economy and introduce foreign capital on a large scale to accumulate technological and capital capabilities, and eventually develop into a major exporter and investment powerhouse. This was the original design.
With this policy, China entered an era of high economic growth in one fell swoop, joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and surpassed Japan in gross domestic product (GDP) to become the world’s second largest economy in 10 years. Deng Xiaoping’s plans seemed to have succeeded spectacularly.
But the socialist market economy had its limitations from the beginning with the “socialist” part in particular. It was clear that the political leadership of the Communist Party in a market economy would become a breeding ground for political corruption. However, after experiencing the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China could not let go of the political leadership of the Communist Party.
During the Jiang Zemin era from the late 1980s through early 2000s, corruption went unchecked, and political reform became mere words. The subsequent Hu Jintao administration tried to impose discipline within the party, but was bogged down by the opposition from the Jiang Zemin faction and vested interests.
Xi’s decade of power consolidation
When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the Chinese Communist Party had deteriorated to the point to be dubbed as “the world’s largest corrupt party.” It was therefore a rational choice for him to advocate the “rule of law” and begin an anti-corruption campaign, in a bid to maintain the party’s rule in China.
Needless to say, the anti-corruption campaign was also about wresting power from the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao factions. In the end, the Xi Jinping regime spent two terms and 10 years seizing power. That is why it was necessary to extend the term of office by amending the constitution.
Yet even now, political corruption has not been eradicated, and economic growth has been steadily slowing due to the coronavirus pandemic along the way. In addition, China is facing various frictions with many countries, including Japan, the United States and Western nations. The Belt and Road initiative of international infrastructure development, which is a centerpiece of the Xi administration’s policies, is not progressing as expected.
In a situation where growth is certain to slow, what should the Xi administration put forward in terms of its principles and ideology? In the end, in the midst of a bleak economic outlook, it can only suppress discontent without principles. Xi has only his former subordinates as aides, and this makes his regime appear to be surrounded by political opponents.
As for his avoidance of promoting the socialist market economy concept, rumor has it that his father, Xi Zhongxun, was removed from an important post after a confrontation with Deng Xiaoping over the treatment of Hu Yaobang, the disgraced one-time protege of Deng’s. But personal grudges or not, the crux of the matter is that the concept has already exposed its serious limitations and is in a state of twilight.
Ideals and objectives in disarray
First, the contradiction between “socialism” and the “market economy” is growing. Promoting a market economy based on the principle of free competition and openness to the outside world means expanding private property rights accordingly and reducing the Communist Party’s political interference in the market.
However, curtailing public ownership and the party’s political leadership in response to the deepening of the market economy will erode the party’s rule and the vested interests flocking to its power. And this is impossible to implement, as shown by the 100-year history of the Chinese Communist Party.
The current Xi administration calls for the continuation of reform and opening up, but in reality, it is promoting centralization under the leadership of the Communist Party, strangling private enterprises and giving preferential treatment to state-owned companies. In the end, the current situation continues without clear guidelines.
Second, the gap between the Chinese economy and the international system is widening. The socialist market economy promoted by Deng Xiaoping and his followers aimed to synchronize the domestic economy with the international system. They did attain a certain level of achievement. Membership in the WTO is a typical example. They also aligned themselves with U.S. engagement policies.
But the Xi administration is talking about dissatisfaction with the existing international system created by Western developed countries after the Second World War, and trying to attract dissatisfied elements in the Global South. The closer a market gets to the existing international system, the more transparent the market needs to be, and the less the Communist Party should intervene in the market. The party cannot take such a risk.
Third, the Xi Jinping regime no longer holds to the socialist market economy as its theoretical basis, but has repeatedly emphasized “Marxism.” Does the current government really embrace Marxism as a theoretical and ideological pillar?
Certainly, if we look at China today, disparity between the rich and the poor has widened to the extreme, and “class” has practically been revived. Ironically, what China needs most today may be a true Communist Party and a true form of Marxism. But the current administration doesn’t seem to be thinking about such drastic changes.
The Xi administration often talks about “the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation” and “a strong modernized socialist country,” but these seem to be just slogans without principles.
A China running astray means its ideals and objectives are being lost. Past leaders are indeed responsible for what China is today, but so are the present leaders. The ordinary men and women of China are tied and muzzled, and remain silent to avoid harm.
“Even the powerful cannot rule as they wish. History tells us no individual ruler can govern singlehandedly. No matter how strong someone may seem, they are just one piece of a big picture.” These are the words of the late Makoto Iokibe, who suddenly passed away in March, in his book “Nichibei Senso to Sengo Nihon” (The Japan-U.S. war and postwar Japan).
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Ryosei Kokubun received his Ph.D. in law from Keio University. He served as the dean of the Faculty of Law and Politics and the director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at Keio, and was the president of the National Defense Academy of Japan from 2012 to 2021. He is the president of the Japan Society for Defense Studies and a former president of the Japan Association of International Relations (2006-2008) and the Japan Association for Asian Studies (2005-2007). He was appointed chairman of the Asian Affairs Research Council in May 2024.